

Thank you for the privilege and opportunity to express my thoughts and perspectives on airport security, in particular the passenger and luggage screening activity. With 489 commercial airports there is a vast range of sizes, shapes and operations that have a huge influence on passenger security. The diversity includes numbers and nationality of passengers, size of terminals, screening equipment, screening areas, employment pools for potential screening hires, airport budgets, leadership and much more.

Political and TSA leadership have limited our choices of the security workforce to two: a federal workforce with TSA oversight and a private workforce with TSA oversight. Two sizes don't fit all airports. There's a continuum of options between those two. For smaller regional airports, a third option should and must be considered: an airport authority workforce with TSA oversight. This choice offers the greatest degree of control, the most flexibility, the most collateral benefits and the most cost savings. Jackson Hole, Wyoming, a PP5 airport, has successfully demonstrated this model for security for nearly two decades. Why are we ignoring this option? Let me offer some cogent points for consideration of this Airport Authority/TSA plan.

Front line command and control would be with the organization that has the greatest responsibility and accountability for airport security, the

Airport Authority. The Authority writes the Airport Security plan, the Airport Emergency Plan, the Airport Certification Manual, Letters of Agreement with FAA, and in the case of Tupelo Regional Airport, the Reimbursable Agreement for Law Enforcement Officers in the security function of the sterile area. Absolute oversight for policy, training and performance would remain, of course, with TSA.

Span of control would be reduced. Instead of adding another level of administration and bureaucracy with a private contractor, another decision chain, additional distribution requirements for information and data, responsibility and accountability would be limited to a single, unencumbered chain of command. There would be no doubt where security issues, human resources issues, equipment issues, lease issues, maintenance issues, administrative issues and operational issues are resolved.

Total airport security must, at some point, be addressed, to include general aviation airports. Do we defer this element of security to another set of private companies? And tactical security issues like MANPAD, do we address those and resulting countermeasures to yet a third set of private contractors. I contend all elements of security are best handled by the organization that has the greatest degree of ownership for security at their airport, the Airport Authority.

Cost will be minimized. Who better can control all the budgetary elements of airport security expenses? Who best can optimize the distribution of part time/full time personnel, the economy of scale in operations, the impact of administrative overhead and the needs of the workforce: a corporate headquarters in Boston or a headquarters on site in Tupelo, Mississippi? And what about these large company cost-plus contracts with hidden expenses and bonuses? Where does all that revenue go? It's not to the local or regional economies that the airports serve. Instead, these profits go to where the corporate headquarters is located. However, if Memorandum of Agreements were crafted so that reasonable administrative costs and bonuses were retained by the Airport Authority, then that revenue stream would benefit airport security infrastructure development and that regional economy.

Let's not ignore the option that best fits the force and strategy to the objective and offers all the complimentary benefits of control, flexibility, accountability, ownership, lowest cost and future adaptability.

Thank you.